Spatializing ‘Just City Planning’: An Evaluation of Citywide Planning Policies in Relation to Ghettoization and Gentrification

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Abstract:

In *The Just City*, Fainstein (2010) proposes principles for directing and evaluating urban planning with regard to the ‘just city’. Equity and a fair distribution of costs and benefits from public policy are central to her concept of social justice, while expanding it with considerations on diversity and democracy. The just city, in her view, may comprise of relatively homogeneous neighbourhoods, as long as their boundaries remain porous and further segregation and large-scale displacement are contained. Although Fainstein mentions the problem of involuntary concentrations of disadvantaged population groups and unequal spatial access to opportunities, her planning principles seem to be more concerned about securing social benefits from given projects and general policies, rather than devising pro-active spatial strategies directed towards equal access to opportunities on a citywide scale.

In this paper, we propose an alternative, spatialized approach to the just city and just planning policies. Following Soja (2010), we assert that space and spatial processes have a central role in producing and reproducing social injustices in terms of access to opportunities. Accordingly, we consider trends of ‘ghettoization’ as a major source of social injustice, where we understand ghettos as areas with high concentrations of disadvantaged people, potentially leading to social marginalization, overburdened schools and a general lack of life chances. ‘Gentrification’ marks another source of injustice, where previously neglected areas become areas of privilege, depriving displaced residents and others from newly created opportunities.

Based on the cases of Birmingham and Zurich, cities with contrasting planning traditions, we offer a discussion of housing and urban renewal policies against the background of city-specific patterns of ghettoization and gentrification. Focusing on the 1990s onwards, we find that the continued marketization of housing and urban renewal efforts in Birmingham have done little to counteract ghettoization, while the public reliance on housing associations and neighbourhood upgrading in Zurich have allowed for exclusionary practices and displacement. For both cities, however, the framework can serve for devising spatially just planning policies. Social justice in cities, we believe, is aided by a spatial understanding of social injustice and corresponding, spatially informed, citywide planning strategies.

Keywords: Just city, spatial justice, urban planning, ghettoization, gentrification, displacement, social housing, urban renewal, GIS mapping
Introduction

There is now a long-standing debate in human geography, sociology and urban planning regarding social justice in the city and the necessary means for making a city more just (e.g., Lefebvre 1968; Harvey 1973). Building on this scholarship, with her book *The Just City* (2010), political theorist and urban planner Susan Fainstein sparked a debate across these disciplines, asking: What are the theoretical foundations underpinning a socially just city? What are the necessary guiding principles for planning policies directed towards social justice in Western cities? How useful are these principles and planning practices for actually achieving social justice in the context of the ideological triumph of neoliberalism and a global capitalist political economy (cp. Marcuse et al. 2009)?

In parallel, Edward Soja, in *Seeking Spatial Justice* (2010) emphasises the role of spatiality in producing and reproducing social injustices from the urban to the global scale. Rather than space being solely where social injustices materialize, he assigns space and the social processes underlying the production of space a central role. He accuses geographers and urban planners of generally not taking an explicit critical spatial perspective. The just city discourse, he notes, tends “to draw attention away from the core arguments about the innovative possibilities that arise from applying an assertive and explicit spatial perspective” (Soja 2010, 30). What Soja and Fainstein have in common, however, is that they both opt for non-Marxist approaches to addressing social injustices for pragmatic reasons. They are concerned with correcting the most pressing social injustices under existing social frameworks, enabling broad political coalitions and inciting more radical reforms over time (Fainstein 2010, 18; Soja 2011, 100).

The main aim of this paper is to show how theory and planning principles for a just city could be grounded more strongly in the idea of spatial justice. We will start with a short presentation of the theoretical foundations and planning principles for the just city as envisioned by Susan Fainstein, before offering a spatial critique to her relatively generalized theory, including a framework for a spatially informed evaluation of citywide housing and urban renewal policies. We continue by illustrating how spatial considerations (ghettoization, gentrification) can and should be made with regard to actual planning practices by means of two selected case studies. We then arrive to a comparative analysis of these two experiences and offer our conclusions.

Just city planning

For elaborating her concept of the ‘just city’, Fainstein departs from a liberal theory of justice, adapting John Rawls’ (1971) argument for a just distribution of primary goods, as a rational response in a hypothetical situation where individuals are behind a veil of ignorance, unaware of their future status in society. In this original position, individuals would fairly agree on the elements of a just society (Fainstein 2010, 15). In a critique to utilitarianism (i.e., greatest happiness of the greatest number), Rawls’ principles include equal basic liberties, equal opportunities to reach advantageous social positions, while emphasising that social and economic differences “are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society” (Rawls 2001, 42–44).

Even though Fainstein’s concept of social justice includes democracy as a procedural dimension, she sees that dimension as subordinated to the substantial criteria of equity and diversity (Fainstein 2010, 175). In Fainstein’s interpretation of Rawls, *equity* refers to “a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the beginning” (Fainstein 2010, 36). In view of current trends in urban policies and planning, and based on her comparative case study for New York, London and Amsterdam, she concludes with a list of planning principles that she sees as conducive of equity. Her first three points relate to housing...
policies and urban regeneration, the two tightly linked policy domains where planners “face equity issues most directly” (Fainstein 2010, 77; other points referring to economic development programs, mega projects, and public transit):  

- “All new housing development should provide units for households with incomes below the median, either on-site or elsewhere, with the goal of providing a decent home and suitable living environment for everyone. [...]”  
- Housing units developed to be affordable should remain in perpetuity in the affordable housing pool or be subject to one-for-one replacement. [...]  
- Households or businesses should not be involuntarily relocated for the purpose of obtaining economic development or community balance. [...] Reconstruction of neighbourhoods should be conducted incrementally so that interim space is available in the vicinity for displaced households who wish to remain in the same location.” (Fainstein 2010, 172–73)  

Responding to the post-structuralist critique that liberal individualism would fail to account for nonmaterial forms of oppression caused by group-based difference (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and culture), Fainstein adds a second criterion to her conception of social justice: diversity. She cites Iris Marion Young, stating that “group differentiation is both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of modern social processes. Social justice [...] require[s] not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression” (1990, 47, cited in Fainstein 2010, 43). Following Young, emancipation requires the rejection of the assimilationist model and the possibility for a social group to define its own identity rather than being imposed an identity from outside (Fainstein 2010, 43). The list of planning principles furthering diversity includes the following four selected points (other points referring to public space and mixed land uses):  

- “Households should not be required to move for the purpose of obtaining diversity, but neither should new communities be built that further segregation.  
- Zoning should not be used for discriminatory ends but rather should foster inclusion.  
- Boundaries between districts should be porous. [...]  
- Public authorities should assist groups who have historically suffered from discrimination in achieving access to opportunity in housing, education, and employment.” (Fainstein 2010, 174)  

The last point resonates with the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen (1992, 1999), which Fainstein uses to amplify her concept of social justice (Fainstein 2010, 54–56). According to this theory, every individual should dispose of non-tradeable and consciously valued opportunities, including life, health, access to education and political and material self-determination (cp. Nussbaum 2000). Accordingly, Fainstein argues that urban residents should not have to trade their quality of life out of financial necessity and that decisions should be judged based on “whether their distributional outcomes enhanced the capabilities of the relatively disadvantaged” (Fainstein 2010, 55). From the planning principles listed above, however, we see that this concern with capabilities becomes highly

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1 Namely, economic development programs should prioritize the interests of employees and (locally rooted) small businesses; megaprojects should provide direct benefits to low-income people; and fares and tolls for intracity transit should be amenable for low-income people.
blurred in concepts like ‘decent home and suitable living environment’ and a general objection to displacement and involuntary relocation.\(^2\)

Moreover, although mentioning the potential problem of involuntary spatial concentrations of disadvantaged population groups (‘ghettoization’) and unequal spatial access to opportunities (Fainstein 2010, 67–68, 76), with her planning principles she seems complacent with securing social benefits from given projects and general policies rather than proactively challenging unjust spatial patterns and processes. While Fainstein criticizes the decreasing commitment for public housing policies and the priority granted to mega projects with housing developments aiming at higher income groups, her propositions mainly call for a project-based ‘justice impact statement’ (Fainstein 2010, 166). Her framework, however, gives little advice as to locational choices, let alone for devising a citywide spatial strategy directed towards equal spatial access to opportunities. At most, Fainstein’s principles listed above urge planners not to support additional segregation and displacement, coupled with general advice for inclusionary zoning, mixed-income housing and incremental urban regeneration. This relaxation of the concern with spatial equity may result from Fainstein’s strong endorsement of the idea that ethnic enclaves can also offer “sanctuaries for cultural difference”, where “enclaves, while being homogeneous on the micro level, contribute to diversity at the metropolitan level” (Fainstein 2010, 76).

In our paper, we take a different understanding of the principle of diversity. While acknowledging the mutually constitutive nature of recognition and redistribution leading to different forms of oppression (Young 1990), with Nancy Fraser (2000) we share the concern that claims for egalitarian distribution are today being displaced by claims for the recognition of identity groups, potentially leading to less redistribution and even more separatism and intolerance. Fraser therefore proposes a concept of recognition that does not require to foster group identity, but rather to see individuals as being of equal social status, as ‘peers in social life’ (Fraser 2004, 129). Besides a material distribution allowing for individual political voice, Fraser thus demands that “institutionalised patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem” (Fraser 2004, 127–28; for a discussion see Fincher and Iveson 2008, 11).

Towards a spatialized version of just city planning

For Soja, spatiality and social processes underlying the production of space in a capitalist economy are central to social justice and injustice (Soja 2010, chap. 2). For our purposes, we do not need to regard all social injustices as fundamentally spatial, as long as we acknowledge that spatial aspects of broader social injustices tend to reinforce social injustice and that “social injustices always have a spatial aspect, and social injustices cannot be addressed without also addressing their spatial aspect” (Marcuse 2010, para. 29; see also discussion by Iveson 2011). Thus, while recognizing the need to also address broader social, economic and political forces – conceived as spatial or not – our aim here is partial in that we are interested in evaluating citywide urban policies and planning with regard to their contribution to spatial justice.

\(^2\) Fainstein introduces the capabilities approach mainly for extending her concern for social justice beyond the primary goods referred to by Rawls (basic rights and liberties, economic freedoms, political rights, income and wealth) when considering the least-advantaged in society (Fainstein 2010, 56). Moreover, the capabilities approach conforms to Fainstein’s position regarding the role of democratic norms in planning, not necessarily requiring deliberative or deep democracy as long as the interests of the least-advantaged population groups are fairly represented by advocates (Fainstein 2010, 173).
What then is spatial justice for Soja? “As a starting point, [spatial justice] involves the fair and equitable distribution in space of socially valued resources and the opportunities to use them” (Soja 2009, 2). In his understanding (Soja 2011, 97), however, spatial injustice needs to be seen as a broader concept than the aspect of ‘territorial justice’ (Davies 1968; Harvey 1973, chap. 3), referring to the allocation of public resources across territorial units based mainly on need rather than population size. ‘Locational discrimination’ more generally refers to the creation of lasting spatial structures of privilege and advantage, where discrimination often follows the lines of class, race, and gender (Soja 2009, 3).3

Soja introduces two examples that highlight the difference between territorial justice and locational discrimination more broadly. He prominently introduces the case of the Bus Riders Union in Los Angeles, successfully challenging the Metropolitan Transit Authority’s discriminatory spatial allocation of investments into the mass transit network. The lasting structures of locational discrimination can be illustrated by ghettos in the context of French urban policies, as investigated by Dikeç (2001). Spatial concentrations of poverty and social exclusion, it is assumed by Dikeç, are produced and reproduced through political, economic and social processes, including land use and housing policies, property and housing markets, and discriminatory social norms.

In our paper, we would like to reframe Fainstein’s discussion of housing and urban renewal policies in the light of spatial processes producing and reproducing structural disadvantage of certain population groups in terms of their individual capabilities. We focus on these two policy fields, although a fuller analysis would need to account also for the planning of public spaces, public transportation networks and school policies that may work for reducing locational disadvantages. Moreover, we concentrate on the policies and spatial processes as they play out at the local level of a municipal jurisdiction. Not negating the relevance of regional, national and global patterns of spatial justice, we believe there is sufficient spatial injustice particularly within core urban municipalities as to make our discussion worthwhile. Although an unequitable allocation of public means might play a role even within the core city (e.g., public transit networks, access to decent public housing), we think that public policy should react more broadly also to economic and social processes involved in producing lasting spatial structures of disadvantage.

Within this framework, and for this subset of planning policies, we consider two main spatial processes of injustice that keep regularly recurring throughout the debate on the socially just city: ghettoization and gentrification-induced displacement and exclusion (see Table 1). In his path-breaking book Social Justice and the City from 1973, David Harvey reminds us that Engels already observed the problem of class-based ghetto formation in Manchester and London of the mid-19th century, as well as the tearing down of centrally located working class neighbourhoods, with their problems not being eliminated but merely shifted elsewhere (Harvey 1973, chap. 4). Both Dikeç (2001) and Soja (2010), for their part, highlight how Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ includes “the right to the use of the center, a privileged place, instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos (for workers, immigrants, the ‘marginal’ and even for the ‘privileged’)” (Lefebvre 1986, 170, translation from 1996, 34). Clearly, a fuller analysis of

3 Spatial injustices, according to Soja (2010, chap. 2), may come from the ‘political organization of space’ (e.g., gerrymandering, exclusionary zoning, institutionalized residential segregation) or from the everyday ‘processes of locational decision making’, leading to distributional inequalities (e.g., health, education, mass transit, housing, employment, environmental hazards) and discriminatory geographies (e.g., gated communities, ethnic enclaves and ghettos). Such redistributive injustice is, in his view, “aggravated further by racism, patriarchy, heterosexual bias and other forms of spatial and locational discrimination” (Soja 2009, 3). Aware that complete socio-spatial equality is never achievable, Soja emphasises the need of carefully selecting the sites of intervention.
planning policies directed towards equitable opportunities would also include the spatial injustices ingrained in transit networks, segregated schools and privatized public spaces highlighted by Soja (2010; for arguments against displacement, for public space and transit justice see also Kohn 2016). Similarly, even if less consequential in their implications, the aspects of segregation and gentrification-induced displacement are the two spatial processes that Fainstein hints at in the above-cited planning principles, complemented with a principle on widely accessible and diverse public spaces (her principle regarding affordable public transit is essentially redistributive, not spatialized).

Table 1: Spatial injustices and Just City Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spatial injustices</th>
<th>Planning domains</th>
<th>Policies/instruments (examples)</th>
<th>Principles for spatially just planning</th>
<th>Just City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ghettoization:</strong> involuntary concentrations</td>
<td>Housing policies (social mixing)</td>
<td>Dispersed mixed-income housing developments (vs. large-scale public housing estates), building regulations/maintenance schemes, rent supplements</td>
<td>Counteracting spatial concentrations of low-skilled/minority residents</td>
<td>Capabilities: Equitable access to opportunities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Urban regeneration</td>
<td>Counteracting urban decline through public investments, housing improvements, employment initiatives</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gentrification:</strong> displacement and exclusion</td>
<td>Housing policies (affordability)</td>
<td>Funding for means-tested social housing units in gentrifying neighbourhoods and throughout the city</td>
<td>Limiting large-scale displacement and exclusion of low-skilled/minority residents</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Land-use and mega projects</td>
<td>Inclusionary residential zoning/minimal social housing requirements, limiting large-scale neighbourhood renewal</td>
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Against the background of such an understanding of socially unjust spatial processes, we thus reintroduce the range of policy instruments that Fainstein considered in the domain of housing policies and urban regeneration, but now discussed in the light of existing patterns and ongoing trends of ghettoization and gentrification-induced displacement and exclusion. The policies and instruments listed in Table 1 are thus tentative positive examples of how municipalities might try to locally
counteract possible trends of ghettoization in some areas of the city, and displacement and exclusion in other areas. Of course, we are fully aware that ghettoization trends and gentrification-induced displacement and exclusion are the result of a myriad of economic, social, political and legal factors, and it is not our ambition to exactly determine to which degree (local) public policies might have caused, enforced or reversed trends of ghettoization, displacement and exclusion. Nonetheless, for many municipal locational choices and localized efforts in housing and urban renewal we should be able to discuss their possible positive or negative impact on processes of ghettoization, displacement and exclusion.

While we would regard ghettoization and massive gentrification-induced displacement and exclusion as spatial injustices all over the world, we are aware that the precise nature of these challenges as well as the available and best-suited mix of planning instruments will vary hugely between cities depending on national, regional and local contexts (cp. Fainstein 2010, 166). The aim of the framework is thus not to finalize a definite list of planning instruments conducive to the just city, but to incite a critical discussion of the use, limitations and necessary adaptations of existing planning strategies on a case by case basis.

Method and data

In order to illustrate the framework and test its more general applicability, we will subsequently apply it to two cities from very distinct planning and housing traditions: land use planning tradition and dual housing system in Birmingham (UK) and integrated hierarchic planning tradition and unitary housing system in Zurich (Switzerland).

For our case studies, we rely on existing case studies and analyses, as well as on own cartographic representations based on census data, housing data and recent educational statistics. The latter quantitative data allows for visually contextualizing the reported secondary information in the citywide patterns and trends for each city from the 1990s onwards. We analyse a list of quantitative indicators aiming at capturing some of the central concepts in our framework (see Table 2). Of course, these quantitative analyses are prone to ecological fallacies; the discussion should therefore also serve to highlight the need for micro data and analysis.

We introduce each case study with maps illustrating existing large spatial inequalities in terms of opportunities for generating an income that is sufficient for subsistence, or in terms of the local primary school’s capacity to equip every child with satisfactory competences and equitable opportunities for following an adequate educational and professional career. Some may object that the observed spatial pattern does not necessarily capture a spatial inequality of economic and educational opportunities, but an inequality of predispositions and efforts of people that happen to be spatially clustered, and they may also point to the potential mobility of people for reaching opportunities elsewhere. Even if these arguments might be true to some extent, the literature on neighbourhood effects and social capital shows ample evidence on how the composition of neighbourhoods, schools and social ties have an independent effect on education, levels of social deviance and social exclusion, health, welfare dependency, employment and social mobility (for a summary on social mixing policies and findings see Fincher et al. 2014, sec. 3). We thus hold on to these indicators as – even if imperfect – proxies for unequal access to opportunities. Our maps are intended to show the relevance of planning policies directed towards a just city in terms of individual opportunities.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Indicators / proxies</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td>Capabilities: local access to opportunities</td>
<td>- % Claimants of welfare benefits; Recipients of welfare benefits&lt;br&gt;- % Pupils achieving minimal level at Key Stage 2; Rate of transition from primary to secondary school by school type</td>
<td>- Annual Population Survey, Jobcentre Plus administrative system, BRES; Statistics of the City of Zurich, Statistical Yearbook 2017&lt;br&gt;- Birmingham City Council; Educational Statistic by the Canton of Zurich, Statistics of Learners (SdL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of ghettoization</td>
<td>- % Non-white residents; % Non-Western immigrants&lt;br&gt;- % Low-skilled occupation (SEG 11 for 1991 and NS-SeC 7 for 2011); % Low-skilled (mandatory school or less)</td>
<td>- UK Census; Swiss Census (1990) and Statistics of the City of Zurich (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing policies: affordability, form of tenure</td>
<td>- Average house price; Monthly rent (private, public)&lt;br&gt;- % Social rented (local authority, others); % Non-profit housing (local authority, housing associations)</td>
<td>- Office for National Statistics; Statistics of the City of Zurich&lt;br&gt;- UK Census; Statistics of the City of Zurich</td>
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Maps on ethnic and socio-economic residential segregation will show the degree and localization of spatial processes of ghettoization and gentrification, giving indications on the spatial injustices suffered in a particular city. Maps on housing prices help explain patterns of ghettoization and identify areas of gentrification. This is the context in which municipal housing and urban renewal projects take place, whether intended for counteracting these developments, or not. Ultimately, these maps also help to assess whether municipal policies may have conformed to the planning principles of limiting or even reversing ongoing trends of ghettoization and gentrification potentially leading to displacement and exclusion, thereby contributing to better access to opportunities.

The housing and urban renewal policies will be described in more qualitative terms, yet complemented with a map on the spatial distribution and extent of non-profit housing. If combined with the ethnic segregation map, we can also identify possible discriminatory practices. In
combination with a map on housing costs, the housing maps will show whether we find public and private non-profit housing concentrated in the most affordable areas or also dispersed in the more expensive areas, allowing a discussion on how the respective allocation practices in these areas might impact on exacerbating or counteracting ghettoization trends.

With regard to urban renewal policies, land use and mega projects, we rely on existing case studies and analyses. Even here, the broad patterns on ghettoization and gentrification will help evaluate whether a particular urban renewal policy, rezoning or a mega project in a particular area might have helped counteract or exacerbate ongoing trends of ghettoization and gentrification-induced displacement and exclusion.

Birmingham: Ghettoization and urban renaissance

Birmingham is England’s second largest city with a population of just over 1 million and Europe’s single largest local authority. Whilst being a relatively prosperous city, Birmingham is persistently placed within the top 10 most deprived local authorities in England by the Index of Multiple Deprivation, with the most recent data for 2015 positioning the City in 6th place (IMD, 2015). This is typical of major urban areas in England, with all core cities home to a disproportionate share of England’s most deprived areas. These cities are also often spatially divided on a number of economic and social indices such as income, employment, health and education.

Looking at indicators of access to opportunities allows us to begin to consider spatial inequalities across Birmingham. Two of these can be found in Figure 1 that shows the latest available data for the percentage of claimants of welfare benefits (principal for the reason of being unemployed) and the percentage of pupils achieving expected levels in reading, writing, maths and science in the sixth year of primary school (national curriculum assessment at Key Stage 2). The data shows the highest levels of claimants in a central band running across the entire City, with over 5.5% of residents in the areas of Erdington, Hodge Hill, Ladywood and Perry Barr claiming unemployment-related benefits. Conversely, the lowest levels of claimants are found in the north in Sutton Coldfield and in the southeast in Selly Oak (home to a large student population) where less than 2.5% and 3.5% of residents receive welfare benefits respectively. This distribution is reflected in the spatial pattern of educational outcomes, with predominantly less than 60% of pupils achieving their expected levels at Key Stage 2 in high claiming areas compared to over 70% in low claiming areas. Even if parental choice and admission criteria in community and faith-based schools may imply school distances of between 2.5 and 4.4 km depending on ethnicity (Easton and Ferrari 2015), from the broad patterns we may infer that access to high performing schools is largely determined by place of residence coupled with ethnicity. Therefore, the data presented in Figure 1 indicates an unequal distribution of access to opportunities in Birmingham.

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4 London is divided into 32 local authority districts. For a critical review on political representation and organisational capabilities in Birmingham see Kerslake (2014).
The relationship between workless households (i.e. claimants) and educational attainment is well-known, linking for example to the effects of income insecurity and instability, a lack of funds for educational extras, a poor diet affecting concentration, and a lack of family support and at home stimulation (Raffo et al., 2007). Moreover, parents’ worklessness has been found to negatively impact the transition of their offspring from school to work (Gregg et al., 2017). The spatial distribution of access to opportunities is closely linked to Birmingham’s ethnic and social composition. For example, a report published by BRAP (an independent think tank based in Birmingham) in 2015 found that Birmingham residents with a Black African background are 2.9 times as likely to be unemployed (but actively seeking work) than White residents (BRAP, 2015). The same report also found that Black pupils in Birmingham are twice as likely to experience fixed-term exclusion compared to the City’s average.

**Ghettoization and planning in Birmingham**

Figure 2 shows the distribution of non-white residents across Birmingham, an indicator commonly used in the UK for investigating ethnic segregation and inequalities in access to opportunities. Data is presented over two decades, allowing for comparisons over time. Between 1991 and 2011, we can see that the spatial configuration of the City’s non-white population remained largely the same but with increasing densities and outwards sprawl. For 2011, we find proportions of more than 75% of non-white residents living in the inner-city areas between Perry Barr and Ladywood as well as between western Hodge Hill and the northern part of Hall Green. Today, these two high-density areas are separated only by the major A38 road running through central Birmingham. Conversely, relatively low proportions of non-white residents are found in the northern and southern fringes of the City in Sutton Coldfield and Northfield. This can in part be explained by a large increase in the overall proportion of Birmingham’s population that is non-white from 17.5% in 1991 to 42.1% in 2011 (ONS), for which

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5 Non-white residents would include mixed/multiple ethnic group; Asian/Asian British; Black/African/Caribbean/Black British; other ethnic group.
research by Dorling and Thomas (2008) suggests that Birmingham will be a majority ‘ethnic-minority’ city by 2026.

Figure 2: Percent of non-white residents in Birmingham

Figure 3: Percent of residents in low-skilled occupations in Birmingham

The spatial distribution of non-white residents in the City dates back to the arrival of first-generation, post-war migrants to the UK in the 1950s and 1960s (see Fenton et al., 2010; Rex and Moore, 1967). Their location of initial residence in Birmingham would have been to some extent indicative of the availability of vacant, and often inadequate and overcrowded dwellings in the inner-city such as in the areas of Sparkbrook, Saltley (between Small Heath and Hodge Hill) and Ladywood. These areas are clearly identifiable in the data for 1991 in Figure 2. In the years since, ethnic minority populations in these areas grew due to a continuation of non-white migrants and higher than average rates of natural increase (Fenton et al., 2010) These same areas have also seen high in-migration from Eastern Europe in the last decade (Fenton et al., 2010). Subsequently, high concentrations of minority ethnic groups
are found in Birmingham’s inner-city. These areas, however, should not be considered as cultural enclaves since non-white residents in these areas show similar signs of net-emigration as white residents (Finney and Simpson, 2007). Furthermore, a report published in 2002 by Birmingham City Council responded to the issue of non-white concentrations by stating that whilst there is “little clarity on why this is happening; this does not appear always to reflect tenants’ own choices” (Power, 2002; p.15). One possible influencing factor, then, is a lack of opportunity for non-white residents. For instance, new migrants are more likely to have qualifications that are not recognized in the UK and earn lower than average incomes (Fenton et al., 2010), thus limiting their residential choices.

Unlike other European cities (e.g. Zurich, see below), however, the concentrations of residents in low-skilled occupations (Figure 3) only partially overlap with high concentrations of immigrants. Whilst in 1991 there are only a few pockets with relative high concentrations of low-skilled people in areas with few non-white immigrants, in 2011 we find larger areas with ghetto-like character both in areas predominantly inhabited either by non-white or white residents. When compared to Figure 1, we recognize the central band with higher shares of low-skilled people reflected in higher shares of welfare benefits claimants, with moderate shares also in Yardley to the east and then again in Northfield to the very south. Also with regard to educational achievement, we now recognize that the lowest performance is found in the majority non-white areas of western Ladywood and western Hodge Hill (Saltley), but also in the majority white areas of eastern Yardley and south-eastern Erdington (Tyburn). This is unsurprising given the link between educational attainment, type of employment and, importantly, income (see Taylor et al., 2012). Achievements in the other areas (including Northfield) are more homogeneous across the City, except the before noted more privileged areas of Hall Green, Selly Oak and Sutton Coldfield (see Figure 1). With this background, therefore, it is imperative to look at how the spatial distribution of low-skilled populations with barriers to accessing opportunities in Birmingham links to the availability of affordable housing.

Housing affordability is understood as the degree to which residential units are accessible to lower-income residents (Meen, 2018). It is often also referred to in relation to the level of choice certain groups of residents have to choose where they live. As we might expect, mean house prices in Birmingham increased rapidly between 1991 and 2011 (Figure 4), almost increasing three-fold in most areas. Of course, this alone does not indicate affordability; however, it is useful for providing a general overview of areas that are relatively more or less affordable for residents on low incomes. Figure 4 shows a similar composition of house prices across Birmingham over two decades, with house prices remaining the highest in Sutton Coldfield, Edgbaston and Hall Green and the lowest in the areas of Ladywood and the western and eastern ends of Hodge Hill. We can see that these areas with the lowest mean house prices tend to be occupied by low-skilled and predominantly non-white residents (except white dominated eastern Hodge Hill). From the four low performing school areas identified above, the majority of non-white cases are located in these most affordable areas, while in white dominated eastern Erdington and eastern Yardley, the low-skilled population tends to live in social housing estates, thus making use of lower-cost housing in areas with mid-range prices in the private market.
Historically, affordable housing in the UK was delivered by the state through social rented housing (Jones and Murie, 2008). In 2011, Birmingham had the largest stock of social housing of all local authorities in England, with 99,592 dwellings either rented from the Council and a smaller but growing number from housing associations (ONS) (Figure 5). Compared to market rent, social rent is clearly cheaper at 52 percent of average market rent for 2017/18 (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018). However, between 1991 and 2011, we can see that overall concentrations of social rented accommodation in Birmingham have decreased, with their total household share decreasing from 32.0 percent to 24.2 percent (ONS). This is largely a reflection of a national Right to Buy scheme introduced in England by the Housing Act 1980, allowing residents in social housing to purchase state-owned properties at subsidised prices. Heralded as the most significant act of privatization of any recent UK government, this radical policy fundamentally changed the structure and operation of the UK’s housing system via the mass transfer of social rented housing into the
private market (Jones and Murie, 2008). The resulting diminution of social housing has had particularly negative consequences for a growing proportion of residents in low-skilled, low-income occupations (Figure 3), with the percentage of economically active residents in unskilled/routine jobs increasing from 5.3% to 10.8% between 1991 and 2011 (ONS). This may be attributable to the ‘hollowing out’ of the labour market, with a decline in mid-skilled jobs and a rise in low- and high-skilled jobs (Goos and Manning, 2007).

The relationship between ethnic composition (Figure 2) and social housing (Figure 5) is complex and dependent on eligibility rights to council housing and subsequent waves of migration (see Rex and Moore, 1967). The data shows us that in 1991, predominantly white, low-skilled residents occupied areas with relatively high density social housing. This is partly reflective of a pattern of residential movement in Birmingham that took place between 1920s and 1970s, when many residents from the inner city took the opportunity to vacate slum areas to move to newly developed, high-quality social housing estates that were built and owned by the Council (Chinn, 1994). Skellington (1981) suggests that these were preferentially allocated to white residents, thus forcing non-white groups to occupy cheap private-rented housing in the inner-city. This proposed a ‘housing class’ system based on access to council housing and the discrimination towards ethnic groups who were ineligible to apply for it, paradoxically placing outright ownership and council housing at the top of the housing class system (Rex and Moore, 1967). Meanwhile, the ‘zones of transition’ of the inner-city were abandoned by the aspirational white working class who were moving to the newly built council housing suburbs. Hence, a set of path dependencies were set up and underpinned by the state.

Following the onset of deindustrialisation in the late 1970s, social housing increasingly became a means to accommodate the most vulnerable in society (Fenton et al., 2010). These included residents who were unable to exercise their right to buy or were otherwise unable to purchase private housing on the open market. Furthermore, the remaining social housing stock was of poor quality as the most desirable stock transferred into the private market (Fenton et al., 2010). A report commissioned in 2002 for example highlighted that “ethnic minorities are over-represented on the waiting list, showing high demand for council housing. But they are seriously under-represented in outer council estates, while forming a large proportion of the population on several inner-city estates” (Power, 2002; p.46). Given the expansion of majority non-white area since the 1990s, from Figure 5 we see that inner-city council estates previously inhabited mainly by white residents have indeed turned into areas populated mainly by non-white residents.

Figure 5 also shows the proportion of social-rented households rented from Birmingham City Council and from other social-renting sources (including registered social landlords, housing associations, housing co-operatives or charitable trusts) by ward for 1991 and 2011. This data illustrates the degree to which public council housing has reduced, partially replaced and complemented by other forms of social rent, partially sold to renters and thus transferred to the private market. These patterns are indeed very different, depending on the neighbourhoods. While the City Council has remained relatively dominant in social housing in the deprived areas of Ladywood, demolitions and sales in the Eastern and Southern fringes led to a strong decrease in the social housing offer. Still in other areas, like eastern Erdington and some attractive neighbourhoods of Perry Barr and Hall Green, other forms of social housing have become more important than council housing. The ‘bleaching out’ of the city centre (Ladywood) in terms of non-profit housing (white spot breaking up the previously dark area in

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6 Historically, there have also been problems of racism in some council estates. To provide an example, Henderson and Karn (1987) describe how following the introduction of a dispersal policy by Birmingham City Council in 1968 in response to growing racial segregation, residents of one out-of-city housing estate threatened a rent strike in an attempt to stop a non-white family occupying a property.
Figure 5) might suggest a concentrated demolition of council housing without a social-rented replacement. Recent analysis by Murie (2018, 130), however, suggests that Birmingham’s council housing stock was in fact least reduced in the city centre (24% compared to city-wide 55%). What the map thus shows is a sharp decline of the social housing share in relation to the private residential developments in a previously industrialised area of the City (see discussion on gentrification further below). Due to the persistence of council housing in areas like eastern Ladywood, Birmingham’s share of council housing has in fact remained high in comparison to other major urban areas in the UK. This is because, unlike many other UK cities, Birmingham’s social housing tenants voted to reject the transfer of the Council’s housing stock to established housing associations in 2002 (Daly et al., 2005). This no vote, therefore, has left a considerable amount of discretion in dealing with social inequalities in the hands of the Council.

The UK’s approach to the provision of affordable housing has changed in recent decades. In addition to social renting, affordable housing is increasingly offered via low-cost homeownership initiatives such as Homebuy and Shared Ownership (Murie and Rowlands, 2008). Yet these schemes have been criticized for encouraging private ownership and further marginalize public renting (ibid, 2008). However, there has more recently been a renewed emphasis on social housing provision. In the Birmingham Development Plan 2031 published in 2017, for example, it is stated that “the City Council is committed to providing high-quality affordable housing for people who are unable to access or afford market housing. This is an important commitment to ensure that a choice of housing is available to all in mixed-income and mixed tenure sustainable communities” (p.112). This corresponds to the most recent Strategic Housing Needs Assessment, published in 2012, that concluded that 38% of Birmingham’s overall housing need is for affordable housing. It is proposed that in order to address this need, Birmingham City Council will provide finance through public subsidy and increase supply by seeking new partnership opportunities to build a new supply of social housing.

Gentrification and planning in Birmingham

Since the late 1980s, Birmingham City Council’s focus has been on economic growth and to transform its image for attracting more highly-skilled, high-income residents to the City (The Highbury Initiative, 1989). As set out during the Highbury Symposium of 1989, the transformation of Birmingham city centre has played a central role in realising this vision. The Council’s strategy consisted of a number of flagship projects, a new spatial division of the city centre, and the promotion of ‘city living’ (Barber & Hall, 2008). The former included public investment in the development of the International Convention Centre, the Barclaycard Arena (formerly known as the Birmingham National Indoor Arena) and Hyatt Hotel, as well as private sector investment in Brindley Place, Broad Street, the Mailbox and the Bullring. Private housing investment has also been key to the Council’s overall strategy to encourage a growing city centre residential population. This has been achieved through the redevelopment of brownfield sites and the repurposing of warehouse and factory areas (including formerly heavily industrialized areas such as the Jewellery Quarter) in central Birmingham. Whilst counteracting possible ghettoization, however, this can lead to gentrification. Whereas the new housing developments commonly did not directly displace people – even the renewal of council housing estates in the city centre was achieved in a sensible manner in cooperation with a locally based housing association (Murie, 2018) – the area has clearly become exclusive to new incoming residents with low incomes. Notwithstanding the City Council’s aim at obliging developers to implement a share of affordable housing, developers have often succeeded to offset such obligations within their so-called S106 planning agreements. Indeed, in Figures 3 and 5 we can observe a clear decline between 1991 and 2011 in the relative share of both low-skilled residents and non-profit housing in and around Birmingham city centre in Ladywood. In the years since, data suggests that this
area of gentrification has expanded, with the western edge of the city centre recorded as having the fastest-rising property prices in the country between 2016 and 2017 (The Guardian, 2017). This same area was also named the poorest place to live in the UK in 2016 (ibid, 2017).

Birmingham’s ‘urban renaissance’, therefore, has been described as being both geographically and socially selective, with Barber and Hall (2008) referring to the “partial nature of the city’s overall economy”. Henry and Passmore (1999, p.61), for example, claim that “flagship projects have created an elite international enclave within Birmingham city centre: a space for the national and international tourist/business class, which is increasingly divorced from its regional/local context”. Loftman and Nevin’s (1994) critique of Birmingham’s urban redevelopment also highlights how flagship projects diverted public spending away from public services such as those relating to housing and social care, with only limited employment opportunities created for Birmingham’s most deprived residents. Furthermore, residential developments in the city centre consisting of high-cost apartments with mainly only one or two bedrooms have primarily catered for a young, highly-mobile professional population to the exclusion of low-income households and families (Barber & Hall, 2008).

Zurich: Neighbourhood upgrading and gentrification

Although Zurich is a comparatively affluent city with unemployment rates usually remaining well below five percent over the last three decades (Stadt Zürich 2017), a look at capabilities and access to opportunities shows significant spatial inequalities within the city (Figure 6). We find the highest levels of welfare dependency in the north-easter parts of the city (district 12). Here, the shares of welfare recipients are between 6 and 10 percent of the population. Similarly, a considerable share of individuals and families in the traditional working class neighbourhoods does not have a labour income that would suffice for their basic needs (districts 4 and 5, without the redeveloped former industrial area). On the other side, the south-eastern neighbourhoods in districts 7 and 8 have the lowest percentages of welfare benefit recipients (below 2 percent). This is not surprising because they cover the mansions on the sunny hill and the gentrified area next to the lakeside promenade. This pattern is repeated if we have a look at transition rates from public primary schools to different types of secondary schools. The school districts covering districts 12 in the Northeast and the more centrally located districts 4 and 5 show the highest transition rates to the less demanding secondary school type B, while the school district at the Southeast has the lowest percentage. In contrast, transition rates to the highly selective grammar school are comparatively high here. Since the composition of primary schools in Zurich is determined by catchment areas, the place of residence has a measurable impact on a pupil’s preparation for its further educational and professional career, independently from its individual socio-economic background (Moser et al. 2011). Altogether, those indicators point to very unequal environments affecting the ambitions and opportunities of differentially located individuals, where the largest divide is between the comparatively most deprived areas close to the city centre and in the Northeast and the most privileged area at the Southeast.
Locational disadvantages in terms of capabilities and access to opportunities in Zurich are closely related to the social and ethnic composition of neighbourhoods, as evidenced by the maps in Figure 7. Whereas the ‘new immigration’ to Zurich is currently marked by high-skilled employees from North-Western European countries (Germany, UK, France), immigration since the 1960s was characterized by low-skilled persons from Southern European countries, added by low-skilled people from ex-Yugoslavia before and during the civil war in the early 1990s (Craviolini 2019). Since it is these immigrants facing difficulties in their educational curricula and on the job market, we decided to map the concentrations of ‘non-western’ immigrants (cp. Heye and Leuthold 2006). In Figure 8, we see that some degree of ghettoization was indeed an issue in the 1990s, with some neighbourhoods characterized by majorities of non-western immigrants and substantial shares of people disposing merely of basic education or less. This was most clearly the case in some neighbourhoods of districts 4 and 5, where the prostitution and open drug scene between ‘Langstrasse’ and ‘Platzspitz’ were recognized as a problem from the 1990s onwards. We will turn to these areas and their changing character when turning to the issue of gentrification further below. Less dramatic but more enduring in terms of ghetto character was the situation in the northern parts of district 12 and the area along the railway corridor ranging from the western part of district 4 to the city border to the West. These are the areas presumably driving the large-scale patterns regarding capabilities in Figure 6, persisting up to the present days.

As has been shown in previous studies, ethnic segregation in Zurich is less a result of community building, but more a result of nationality-specific socio-professional characteristics (Heye and Leuthold 2006, 26), and thus a differing dependence on low-cost housing. In order to understand the spatial patterns of ghettoization as well as its shrinking, it is important to consider the spatial patterns in the relative affordability of housing (Figure 9). Since rented housing makes the lion share in the housing structure of Zurich (approximately 90 %), we compare housing costs in terms of monthly rents. From the figure we see that private market rents have in average more than doubled over the last 25 years (see shifted price ranges), and the private rents have then as now differed highly between districts. Nowadays, private rents are highest in district 1 due to an increase in attractiveness of old town living

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7 For the identification of non-western people we excluded the following western nationalities: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Leichtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK (for 1990 we could not account for Norway, Luxembourg or Iceland, since these countries were subsumed under the category ‘other European countries’).
over time. They are also high in districts 3 and 7. The cheapest areas are located in district 4 as well as in districts 11 and 12 on the outskirts. The comparatively high affordability of rental housing in these areas may be attributed to the low attractiveness for people who can afford to live in less deprived neighbourhoods (see Figure 7).

*Figure 7: Percent of non-western immigrants in Zurich*

Figure 8: Percent of low skilled residents in Zurich

How has housing policy in Zurich responded to segregation patterns and challenges in affordable housing? Compared to other major Swiss cities, the City of Zurich has consistently played an active role in land banking, urban planning and the allocation of sites for non-profit housing construction. In contrast to the UK, Switzerland follows the unitary housing model, thus dedicating the non-profit housing to a broad range of income levels (Kemeny 1995). Thus, while less amenable for targeted social mixing policies through allocating public housing to achieve the right neighbourhood mix, the unitary model allows for social mixing within estates, potentially leading to a more diffuse contribution to social mixing of their immediate neighbourhood. There is a long tradition of housing associations, which together with the city of Zurich provide affordable housing (Lawson 2010). The non-profit housing sector is promoted through an encompassing land policy in which land prices are not based on the usual market prices, but on the financial possibilities of future residential uses and supply-side financial aids (see section on “Wohnbauaktion” below) (Balmer 2017: 74). By the year 2015, the share of non-profit housing is at 25% (City of Zurich 2016). Following three initiatives in 2011 and a final direct democratic vote, an even more ambitious goal of reaching a share of one third for non-profit housing by 2050 – including all the units owned by housing associations and the city itself – was inscribed in an article of the municipal code (the so-called fundamental article on housing policy, see article 2quarter). In addition, the non-profit housing sector was significantly strengthened by this
initiative (Balmer 2017: 79), although some observers criticize that construction activity by the private rented sector is largely unaffected by the targets set in the fundamental article (Scherr 2016).

A special instrument first introduced in 1943 is called "Wohnbauaktion" for the targeted subvention of selected units within larger blocks and thus for the promotion of social mixing. Today, the City of Zurich aims to subsidize between 20 and 30 percent of the units in new non-profit residential estates (City of Zurich 2017). These long-term benefit payments for objects are a major characteristic of Zurich’s promotion policy for affordable housing, leading to a price reduction for land, constructions and dwellings (Caduff 2000). The municipal parliament decides the amount of money spent on these urban framework credits, but the population has to approve the decision in a direct democratic vote. Usually, there is a controversial debate in the parliament about the amount spent, but the instrument itself is not disputed from any political party and the spatial dimension (i.e. in which neighbourhood this money needs to be spent) is rarely discussed at this stage. Moreover, we need to be aware that only around 3% of all apartments in Zurich are subsidized by this kind of grant (Glaser 2017, 76), thus limiting the potential of targeted social mixing.

In Figure 9, we see that rents in the non-profit sector are generally substantially lower than private sector rents, with much less marked differences across districts, yet with a less drastic but still marked increase over time. Figure 10 reveals that non-profit housing can be predominantly found in neighbourhoods on the periphery in the North-East and to the South. The share of dwellings in possession of the city decreased from 7.9 percent in 1995 to 6.8 percent in 2015 (see City of Zurich 2016) despite the communal initiative demanding a more active role of the city in the field of housing. Here, a distinction between units owned by housing associations and units in possession of the city can be made. Publicly owned housing by the city remains primarily important in the historic centre (district 1) and the traditional working class neighbourhoods (district 4) with shares between 14 and 25 percent.

With regard to public housing, there have been big controversies in the parliament surrounding the question of who should have the right to live in city-owned flats. Compared to housing associations, public housing has more rigid allocation guidelines (such as in terms of rooms per inhabitant, maximum income and assets, etc.), but in both cases their continued fulfilment is not controlled and sanctioned. Only recently, the municipal parliament decided on a more targeted approach, defining tougher sanction and control mechanisms. Since then, tenants in units owned by the city must have a taxable income that is less than the rent multiplied by four at the time when the rent contract starts. Controls will be conducted every two years (Huber & Siegrist 2017).

While the discussion on access to public housing has been mainly sparked by privileged renters in the now high-priced historic centre, with the city’s strong presence in the western part of district 4, it might have actually contributed to ghettoization in an area where also market prices have remained relatively low. The city’s presence is epitomized by four public tower houses called ‘Hardau’ in midst of an area that a federal report has considered as one of thirty Swiss ‘problem neighbourhoods’ (Arend 2008). A closer look at figures 7 and 8, however, reveals that the very premise of the four public tower houses turns out to have relatively lower shares of non-western immigrants and low-skilled residents, thus potentially contributing to some minimal form of social mixing in the immediate neighbourhood (see also Hugentobler 2017; City of Zurich 2015a).
Dwellings owned by housing associations, for their part, are more diversely spread also in low-cost as well as medium-priced neighbourhoods, in some neighbourhoods representing more than 50% of dwellings (see City of Zurich 2016). Here, however, the domination of Swiss nationals in certain housing associations is an issue. “The regular clientele of these housing [associations] consists of low to middle-income families, couples and single persons of mainly Swiss nationality” (Glaser 2017: 76). The large share of non-profit housing is delivered by private housing associations that in many cases have less interest in social mixing. This can be illustrated by the neighbourhood with the highest share of non-profit housing, Friesenberg to the South-West, which at the same time has a remarkably low share of immigrants and unskilled people, as is confirmed when confronting fine-grained maps on the respective housing estates with our Figures 7 and 8. Given the high reliance of the city on private housing associations and the reluctance for new housing developments built and provided by the city, the government of Zurich lacks effective instruments for counteracting ghettoization processes as well as gentrification-induced displacement directly on their own. To some degree, the city aims at better contributing to social mixing by expanding their own housing estates in a diverse range of neighbourhoods.

Gentrification and planning in Zurich

From the 1990s onwards, a process of reurbanisation has taken place in Zurich. Primarily young and highly educated singles and couples have moved into the city again. This process was supported by a couple of planning policies with the aim of upgrading less attractive neighbourhoods in order to keep up in the global competition between cities (Widmer 2009). These policies have also been called “state-induced gentrification” (Plüss & Schenkel 2014: 20) more recently. This renewed attractiveness
of the city had negative side effects on the housing market, even leading to the displacement of old-established inhabitants. Those districts in the city centre are socio-economically upgraded by an urban middle class moving in, while disadvantaged people and families are being displaced to the periphery or even outside the city (Heye and Leuthold 2004: 65). An indication for ongoing gentrification and possible displacement is the decreasing share of foreigners and low skilled people in those areas in districts 3, 4 and 5 between 1990 and 2010 (see Figures 7 and 8; Feller 2017).

The history of the ‘Langstrasse’ area (districts 4 and 5) is of particular interest here. Beginning with the shutdown of the open drugs scene in 1992, they “[…] became a famous clubbing scene and also gained attractiveness as living environment for higher income residents” (Widmer and Kübler 2014: 218; Craviolini et al. 2009). In 1995, the communal executive in cooperation with commercial and neighbourhood associations launched the project ‘Pro Langstrasse’, aiming at improving the quality of life and the social mix in this area by limiting prostitution and drug dealing in the area, combined with some physical measures. Offices and chain stores were increasingly crowding out the old-established inhabitants and small businesses from the city centre (City of Zurich 2013). In 2010, political parties from the left even began to voice critique about the upgrading process and discussed the issue of gentrification-induced displacement of low-income residents for the first time (Bürgi 2014: 47).

In parallel to the upgrading processes along Langstrasse, urban renewal policies in the large former industrial areas directly adjacent to the North-West (district 5) were marked by a new era of participative and cooperative planning. After the city’s zoning plan from 1992 envisioning a mixed-use neighbourhood failed due to resistance by land owners and due to a market-oriented municipal zoning plan imposed by the canton, in 1996 the city mayor exercised political leadership and summoned the so-called Stadtforum, in which all relevant actors for urban development in “Zurich West” participated. While breaking the deadlock for the area’s urban development, the cantonal liberal approach could not be undone. Next to large office buildings and some high-priced residential condominiums, pioneers in the process of gentrification started with intermediate creative use of space and stimulated the development to one of Zurich’s most trendy nightlife districts. As a learning effect, political actors began to recognize the importance of intermediate use and the relevance of supporting measures in the process of gentrification (Thissen 2015, Rérat & Lees 2011).

Equally, to the South of the Langstrasse area, another neighbourhood upgrading process set in. A western bypass opening in 2010 and rigorous traffic calming measures on the traditional transit route from South to West (“Westtangente”) substantially changed the composition of the population in the northern parts of district 3 (see Figures 7 and 8). While property owners did not invest a lot in the period from 1995 to 2011, closing down some of the transit roads resulted in large increases of investments, the construction of new hotels and the displacement of inhabitants (see e.g. Eppenberger & Gasser 2011). Before 2006, length of stay in this area had been among the shortest in the whole city, especially for Swiss citizens (City of Zurich 2006). Nowadays, trends of gentrification and displacement are unfolding because of the newly acquired attractiveness. Not only has the quality of life increased due to these calming measures, but the more socially and ethnically mixed school composition has also attracted better-off families (see Neuhaus 2019).

Generally speaking, the period from 2001 to 2015 is characterized by an increase of people with high social status (skills and income combined) across the whole city (see also Figure 8). In total, the share of the group with a high social status increased from roughly 35 percent in 2001 to about 50 percent in 2015. At the same time, the percentage for low social status groups decreased from around 35 to less than 25 percent. This pattern holds for all districts of the city, but in district 4 the increase in social status has been exceptionally steep (Büchi 2017).
On disinvestment, socio-spatial blindness and future directions

Overall, the evidence presented for the case of Birmingham suggests that urban regeneration and housing policies in the city has largely not been concerned by issues of spatial justice over recent decades. This can be seen, for example, in the way that Birmingham city centre has been prioritised as an area for high-levels of investment over tackling deprivation and unemployment in the inner-city. After decades of discriminatory assignment of newly built council housing to white people, public disinvestment and the Right to Buy initiative have now left disadvantaged minorities with the remaining stock of non-profit housing, predominantly in the deprived inner-city areas, characterized by high dependency on benefits and low performing schools.

There has, however, been a series of area-based policy interventions over the years, especially under New Labour between 1997 and 2010, that focused on the physical regeneration and improvement of the social and economic conditions of Birmingham’s most deprived neighbourhoods. For example, the New Deal for Communities policy saw the areas of Aston and Kings Norton targeted as two of a total of 39 projects set-up in England. These projects included housing and environmental improvements and employment initiatives (Crowley et al., 2012). Subsequent evaluations of these projects, however, have found that relative disadvantage in these neighbourhoods did not change as a result (Crowley et al., 2012; Fenton et al., 2010). Birmingham City Council’s approach has been reflective of the wave of urban entrepreneurialism that has been spreading across cities since the turn towards capitalism (Lee, 2010; 2013). As Harvey (1989; p.3) writes, “urban governance has become increasingly preoccupied with the exploration of new ways in which to foster and encourage local development and employment growth. Such an entrepreneurial stance contrasts with the managerial practices of earlier decades which primarily focused on the local provision of services, facilities and benefits to urban populations”. The City’s basic policy stance, which in the past was to “control” and even “deflect” activity, has been to “welcome”, “encourage”, “nurture” and “promote” activity (City Centre Strategy, 1988). This was reflected in the Birmingham Big City Plan 2030 that states “the masterplan is not intended to be a rigid, land use zoning plan. It respects that investment markets need the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances and that rigid zoning will inhibit our ambition to grow the city core and create a livable city centre”.

Similarly, housing and urban renewal policies in Zurich do not seem to take issues of spatial justice much into consideration. Zoning and urban renewal policies have rather tended to cement and reinforce existing residential segregation tendencies and the instrument of Wohnbauaktion rarely considers spatial aspects. The heavy and century-long reliance on housing associations enables a significant share of relatively affordable housing across the city, but housing associations and the city cannot be equated. Concerns of spatial justice could be pursued more compelling with a more active role of the city itself in housing. In addition, several housing associations experimenting with new and creative forms of living arrangements can be seen as a driver of unjust developments, particularly gentrification-induced displacement. Only recently, the city published a guideline for including socio-spatial aspects in planning, building and urban renewal. The socio-spatial concerns listed in this document are similar to Sojas (2010) definition of spatial justice as equitable distribution of resources, services, and access to them, but they do not go so far and stay superficial. A broad offer of housing allowing a residential mix, good access to public transportation and social infrastructure such as schools or kindergarten are some of these targets (City of Zurich 2015b).
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